Multiple large shareholders and workplace safety
This study examines the effect of multiple large shareholders on workplace safety. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in industries with high workplace safety hazards from 2008 to 2020, we find that firms with multiple large shareholders have higher workplace fatalities than firms with a single large shareholder. Mechanism tests show that workplace fatalities increase with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. Moreover, the positive impact of multiple large shareholders on workplace fatalities is more pronounced in firms with higher reputational costs, legal costs, and political costs. These results support the cost-sharing hypothesis, where multiple large shareholders may share the costs of employee fatalities, leading firms with multiple large shareholders to be more likely to sacrifice workplace safety for short-term benefits. The cross sectional tests further show the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and workplace fatalities is weaker in firms with employee stock ownership plans and for firms with higher financing constraints. Overall, this paper reveals a potential dark side of multiple large shareholders from the perspective of employee treatment, and has important implications for the effect of ownership on corporate governance.
中央财经大学会计学院教授、博士生导师，国家级高层次青年人才、财政部全国会计领军人才、中央财经大学“龙马学者”青年学者。主要研究领域为公司治理、公司财务。在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》、《世界经济》、《中国工业经济》、The Accounting Review等期刊发表论文八十余篇。担任《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》、《世界经济》、《中国工业经济》、Journal of Business Ethics、Management and Organization Review等期刊的匿名审稿人。主持国家自然科学基金三项。担任国家自然科学基金、国家社会科学基金通讯评议专家。获得教育部科学研究成果奖二等奖等多项省部级奖项。